

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-11 L-03

ACDA-19 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OMB-01 SS-20 NSC-07 IO-14 DRC-01

DODE-00 NIC-01 /135 W

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P 091716Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4335

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION BERLIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BONN 12466

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GW, WB, UK, US, FR, NATO

SUBJECT: NATO INTEREST IN BERLIN

REF: STATE 173775

AT BONN GROUP MEETING AUGUST 9, FRENCH REP (DE LASSUS) INDICATED THAT WHILE HE WITHOUT FORMAL INSTRUCTIONS, HIS FOREIGN OFFICE IS WORKING ON DRAFTING CHANGES AND IS OPPOSED TO MAKING TEXT OF AUGUST 5 THREE POWER ORAL STATEMENT AVAILABLE TO NATO ALLIES; HE SUGGESTED ADDING PARA TO NATO BRIEFING PARAPHRASING STATEMENT AS WAS DONE IN NATO BRIEFING FEBRUARY 1974. UK US, AND FRG REPS GOT FRENCH REP TO AGREE TO URGE HIS FOREIGN OFFICE TO FOREGO OR LIMIT DRAFTING CHANGES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO PERMIT EARLY SUBMISSION OF BRIEFING TO NATO. BONN GROUP EXPECTS TO DISCUSS ANY FRENCH SUGGESTIONS AND DRAFT PARAPHRASING OF AUGUST 5 ORAL STATEMENT EARLY NEXT WEEK.
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HILLENBRAND

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-11 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07

DODE-00 EB-11 NIC-01 DRC-01 /165 W

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R 071603Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4260

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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INTRODUCTION OF A NUCLEAR ELEMENT IS NOT PART OF CM-73 (83) AND, THEREFORE, ITS USE WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED AT NATO. FORMAL APPROVAL OF THE USE OF THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL AND A COMMON ALLIED POSITION ARE REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THE NUCLEAR ELEMENT. AS FOR THE ACTUAL DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR ELEMENT IN NATO, THE GERMANS BELIEVE THAT A SPECIFIC, DISCREET FORUM COULD

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BE DEvised WHICH WOULD MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF SECURITY LEAKS. THE FRG POSITION HAS BEEN AND REMAINS THAT THE INITIATIVE FOR SUGGESTING THE INTRODUCTION OF THE NUCLEAR ELEMENT RESTS WITH THE AMERICANS. HOWEVER, THE FRG IS WAITING TO BE FORMALLY CONSULTED.

4. IN DISCUSSING VARIOUS TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE USE OF OPTION III, ROTH EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE NUCLEAR CARD BARGAINING LEVERAGE MIGHT BE EXPENDED TO OBTAIN MORE IMMEDIATE ALLIED OBJECTIVES, WITH NOTHING REMAINING TO OBTAIN THE COMMON CEILING. HE IS DUBIOUS THAT THE NUCLEAR OPTION SHOULD BE PRESENTED AS A PACKAGE RATHER THAN IN ITS INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS. ROTH BELIEVES FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS ON TACTICS AND CEILINGS STILL HAVE TO BE ANSWERED. HE REFUSED TO SAY WHETHER THE INTRODUCTION OF THE NUCLEAR CONCEPT COULD BE TESTED ON A CONCEPTUAL PLANE WITH THE EAST. HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE PROBLEM OF F-4'S AND THEIR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN A REDUCTION PACKAGE. HE SAID THE FRG IS CONCERNED ABOUT FUTURE SACEUR STRIKE FORCE FLEXIBILITY, ASKING RHETORICALLY WHETHER SUCH FORCES, ONCE REDUCED, COULD BE INCREASED AGAIN. ROTH SAID SACEUR MILITARY STUDIES ON SUCH ISSUES HAD NOT YET BEEN DISCUSSED AMONG THE ALLIES, AND HE STRONGLY IMPLIED THE FRG WOULD WELCOME SUCH DISCUSSIONS.

5. ROTH SAID THE BRITISH POSITION IS THAT A SOVIET NUCLEAR REDUCTION SHOULD BE SOUGHT IN RETURN FOR WESTERN NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS. ROTH DOES NOT SUPPORT THIS BRITISH POSITION. NEVERTHELESS, HE ALLUDED TO THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS WHICH MIGHT ARISE SHOULD U.S. NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS NOT BE MATCHED BY COMPARABLE SOVIET MOVES. ROTH OFFERED HIS OPINION THAT THE PROPOSED NUCLEAR ELEMENT WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO SECURE THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY. INSTEAD, HE IS FEARFUL THAT THE SOVIETS, IN AGREEING TO REDUCE A TANK ARMY FOR U.S. NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS, WOULD ALSO ATTEMPT TO TIE DOWN THE FRG TO SPECIFIC BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS.

6. THE PRINCIPAL POINT OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FONOFF AND MOD OFFICIALS IS ON PHASING. MOD OFFICIALS HAVE TAKEN A
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MORE LIBERAL POSITION, STATING THAT BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE ARE POSSIBLE PROVIDED ACCEPTABLE MODALITIES CAN BE WORKED OUT. ALTHOUGH ROTH HIMSELF AT ONE TIME INDICATED A CERTAIN RECEPTIVITY TO THIS POSSIBILITY, HE RESTATED THE FRG POSITION, EMPHASIZING STRONGLY THAT THE FRG IS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS AS PART OF THE ALLIED MOVEMENT TOWARD THE COMMON CEILING. ANY SUCH BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS MUST BE TIED TO AN AGGREGATE CEILING, AND THE "EUROPEAN OPTION" FOR FUTURE DEFENSE COOPERATION MUST BE KEPT OPEN. ROTH STATED HIS GOVERNMENT IS NOT NOW WILLING TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC BUNDESWEHR REDUCTION NUMBERS.

7. ROTH WONDERED WHETHER ALL USG AGENCIES WERE ALSO

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----- 124684

R 071603Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4261

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

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INTERESTED IN BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS, ALLUDING SPECIFICALLY TO THE POSSIBILITY OF RESISTANCE IN DOD TO SUCH CUTS. IN DISCUSSING SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN A FIRST PHASE BUNDESWEHR REDUCTION, ROTH ASKED WHETHER THE CONCEPT OF ASYMMETRY WOULD BE MAINTAINED WERE SUCH REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN. HE POINTED OUT THE PROBLEM OF ASYMMETRY WOULD BE QUITE DIFFERENT IN THE SECOND

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PHASE, BUT THAT FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS SHOULD ALSO BE ASYMMETRICAL. ROTH IS WELL AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY

OF PRESSURE BY CERTAIN ALLIES TO PARTICIPATE IN FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS. IT IS BELIEVED ROTH'S STATED POSITION ON BUNDESWEHR FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS IS SUBJECT TO REVISION. ROTH IS ALSO INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT CURRENT USG THINKING IS WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWALS IN PHASE TWO.

8. IN DISCUSSING THE FALL ROUND, ROTH STATED THE FRG IS UNDER NO PRESSURE TO MOVE, ALTHOUGH HIS GOVERNMENT IS WILLING TO CONSIDER THE NEED FOR POSSIBLE MOVEMENT ON PARTICULAR ISSUES. ROTH DOES NOT SEE TOO MUCH HOPE FOR MOVEMENT IN THE NEXT ROUND GIVEN THE APPARENT CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PERCEIVED SOVIET NEED FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF ITS GOALS IN CSCE FIRST BEFORE MOVING IN MBFR. GIVEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF LITTLE PROGRESS, ROTH WOULD PREFER THAT THE ALLIES STICK WITH THEIR PRESENT PROGRAM AND NOT GO BEYOND CM - 73 (83). THE FRG WILL NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO SUGGEST CHANGES IN THE ALLIED POSITION, BUT RATHER WILL WAIT FOR THE USG LEAD, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE NUCLEAR ELEMENT.

9. ROTH PROPOSE TO VISIT WASHINGTON IN EARLY SEPTEMBER FOR POLICY DISCUSSIONS WITH HIGH LEVEL USG OFFICIALS. AT THAT TIME IT IS IMPORTANT THAT HE RECEIVE A THOROUGH BRIEFING ON THE U.S. POSITION SINCE HE WILL BRIEF FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND DEFENSE MINISTER LEBER WHEN HE RETURNS TO BONN. BOTH MINISTERS WILL MEET WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IN MID-SEPTEMBER TO SET FRG GUIDELINES FOR THE FALL SESSION. HILLENBRAND

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 27 JUL 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: BERLIN TRIPARTITE MATTERS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 AUG 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974BONN12466
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D740218-0810
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740889/abbrzcau.tel
Line Count: 249
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: STATE 173775
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 20 JUL 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20-Jul-2001 by worrelsw>; APPROVED <15 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NATO INTEREST IN BERLIN
TAGS: PFOR, GE, WB, UK, US, FR, NATO
To: STATE
NATO BRUSSELS
LONDON
PARIS
MOSCOW
BERLIN
Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005